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Secure Software Development Framework
Secure Software Development Framework and Build/Deploy CI/CD Steps
Achieving Build and Deploy Tasks of the Secure Software Development Framework
The Secure Software Development Framework, developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), provides a comprehensive approach to ensuring security across the software development process, from initial design through deployment and maintenance. The framework outlines key practices and guidelines that organizations can implement to secure their software development lifecycle (SDLC), with a particular emphasis on integrating security into automated processes. This chapter focuses specifically on DevSecOps tooling and practices related to Build and Deploy actions of the CI/CD pipeline to achieve:
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Prepare the Organization (PO) |
Organizations should ensure that their people, processes, and technology are prepared to perform secure software development at the organization level. Many organizations will find some PO practices to also be applicable to subsets of their software development, like individual development groups or projects. |
Protect the Software (PS) |
Organizations should protect all components of their software from tampering and unauthorized access. |
Produce Well-Secured Software (PW) |
Organizations should produce well-secured software with minimal security vulnerabilities in its releases. |
Respond to Vulnerabilities (RV) |
Organizations should identify residual vulnerabilities in their software releases and respond appropriately to address those vulnerabilities and prevent similar ones from occurring in the future. |
1 - Protect the Organization (PO)
Protect the Organization (PO) for the Build and Deploy CI/CD Steps
Protect the Organization (PO)
Organizations should ensure that their people, processes, and technology are prepared to perform secure software development at the organization level. Many organizations will find some PO practices to also be applicable to subsets of their software development, like individual development groups or projects.
PO.1
Define Security Requirements for Software Development: Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization’s policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).
To satisfy SSDF PO.1 in a Build and Deploy context using open-source tools, the focus shifts from just defining to:
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Enforcing security policies on dependencies, code, and configurations.
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Verifying compliance with established security baselines before deployment.
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Ensuring artifacts meet DoD, NIST, or organizational security requirements.
Tasks |
Tools |
P.O.1.1: Identify and document all security requirements for the organization’s software development infrastructures and processes, and maintain the requirements over time.
PO.1.2 Identify and document all security requirements for organization-developed software to meet, and maintain the requirements over time.
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Open Policy Agent
Enforces security and compliance policies during build and deployment (e.g., blocking deployments if SBOM scan fails).
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Conftest
Uses OPA’s Rego language to test Kubernetes manifests, Terraform, and Dockerfiles against predefined security requirements.
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InSpec
Tests infrastructure and deployed applications against compliance frameworks (e.g., CIS Benchmarks, NIST 800-53).
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Kyverno
Kubernetes-native policy engine to enforce secure configurations at deploy time.
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Checkov
Scans Infrastructure-as-Code (IaC) during build to ensure compliance with security requirements before deploy
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Trivy
Scans container images, IaC, and SBOMs for vulnerabilities and misconfigurations before deployment.
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Clair
Static analysis for container images to ensure they meet security requirements before push to registry.
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Grype
Vulnerability scanning for container images and filesystems to validate artifacts against policy before deploy.
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Sigstore Cosign
OPA-based admission controller to enforce compliance on Kubernetes clusters before allowing deployment.
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PO.2
Implement Roles and Responsibilities: Ensure that everyone inside and outside of the organization involved in the SDLC is prepared to perform their SDLC-related roles and responsibilities throughout the SDLC.
To satisfy SSDF PO.2 in a Build and Deploy context using open-source tools, the focus shifts to:
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Enforcing role-based access control (RBAC) to limit who can trigger builds, approve changes, and deploy.
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Providing audit logs and traceability of actions for accountability.
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Ensuring code changes and deployments are reviewed by authorized personnel.
Tasks |
Tools |
PO.2.1: Create new roles and alter responsibilities for existing roles as needed to encompass all parts of the SDLC. Periodically review and maintain the defined roles and responsibilities, updating them as needed.
PO.2.2: Provide role-based training for all personnel with responsibilities that contribute to secure development. Periodically review personnel proficiency and role-based training, and update the training as needed
PO.2.3: Obtain upper management or authorizing official commitment to secure development, and convey that commitment to all with development related roles and responsibilities.
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Keycloak
Open-source identity and access management for enforcing RBAC in CI/CD pipelines and deployment tools.
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Dex
Federated OpenID Connect provider to integrate developer identities into build and deploy systems for role-based access.
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Vault by HashiCorp
Securely manages and controls access to secrets based on defined roles during builds and deployments.
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Argo CD
GitOps deployment tool with RBAC to control who can sync, approve, or rollback deployments.
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Jenkins with Role Strategy Plugin
Adds fine-grained RBAC to Jenkins pipelines, limiting build and deployment actions to authorized roles.
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Tekton Pipelines
Kubernetes-native CI/CD with Kubernetes RBAC to control pipeline execution permissions.
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Flux CD
GitOps tool enforcing RBAC for deployment workflows and requiring approvals for changes.
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Kubernetes RBAC
Built-in access control to restrict who can deploy, modify, or delete workloads.
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Gitea
Self-hosted Git service with user roles and repository permissions to enforce approval and review workflows.
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Auditbeat
Provides audit logging for build and deploy actions, helping track compliance with assigned responsibilities.
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PO.3
Implement Supporting Toolchains: Use automation to reduce human effort and improve the accuracy, reproducibility, usability, and comprehensiveness of security practices throughout the SDLC, as well as provide a way to document and demonstrate the use of these
practices. Toolchains and tools may be used at different levels of the organization, such as organization-wide or project-specific, and may address a particular part of the SDLC, like a build pipeline.
To satisfy SSDF PO.3 in a Build and Deploy context using open-source tools, the focus shifts to:
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Ensuring build and deployment tools are configured securely and kept patched.
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Protecting against supply chain attacks targeting the CI/CD pipeline.
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Verifying the integrity of tools and artifacts before use.
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Controlling and monitoring access to toolchains.
Tasks |
Tools |
PO.3.1: Specify which tools or tool types must or should be included in each toolchain to mitigate identified risks, as well as how the toolchain components are to be integrated with each other.
PO.3.2: Follow recommended security practices to deploy, operate, and maintain tools and toolchains.
PO.3.3: Configure tools to generate artifacts6 of their support of secure software development practices as defined by the organization.
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Sigstore Cosign
Signs and verifies build artifacts to prevent deploying tampered software.
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SLSA Framework + slsa-verifier
Ensures build provenance and verifies the integrity of artifacts before deploy.
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Gitleaks
Scans repos and build pipelines for secrets before build execution.
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Argo CD
GitOps deployment tool with RBAC to control who can sync, approve, or rollback deployments.
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Trivy
Scans CI/CD tool containers and dependencies for vulnerabilities.
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Syft
Generates SBOMs for build artifacts to track components used in the toolchain.
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Clair
Analyzes container images used in builds/deploys for vulnerabilities.
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Vault by HashiCorp
Protects secrets used by build/deploy tools, ensuring they’re not exposed in pipelines.
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DefectDojo
Centralizes and tracks security testing results for build and deploy toolchains.
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Open Policy Agent (OPA)
agent.org/ Enforces security rules on CI/CD and deployment workflows to prevent unsafe actions
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Auditbeat
Monitors and logs CI/CD toolchain activity for integrity and compliance.
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PO.4
Define and Use Criteria for Software Security Checks: Help ensure that the software resulting from the SDLC meets the organization’s expectations by defining and using criteria for checking the software’s security during development.
To satisfy SSDF PO.4 in a Build and Deploy context using open-source tools, the focus shifts to:
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Applying consistent security testing and validation practices before release.
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Automating security checks in CI/CD pipelines.
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Using standardized processes for verifying, signing, and tracking artifacts.
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Integrating security gates so no insecure artifact is deployed.
Tasks |
Tools |
PO.4.1: Define criteria for software security checks and track throughout the SDLC.
PO.4.2: Implement processes, mechanisms, etc. to gather and safeguard the necessary information in support of the criteria.
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OWASP Dependency-Check
Automates open-source dependency scanning in builds to enforce consistent vulnerability detection.
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Semgrep
Static analysis integrated into builds to ensure consistent code security checks before deploy.
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Bandit (for Python)
Python security linting in build pipelines to maintain consistent language-specific checks.
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Trivy
Consistent vulnerability and IaC scanning before deployment.
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Grype
Maintains consistent vulnerability scanning for all build artifacts.
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InSpec
Automates compliance checks before deployment to ensure practices match organizational standards.
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Sigstore Cosign
Standardizes artifact signing and verification so only trusted builds are deployed.
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Open Policy Agent (OPA)
Enforces organization-wide deployment policies across all environments.
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DefectDojo
Centralizes and standardizes vulnerability tracking and remediation workflows across builds.
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PO.5
Implement and Maintain Secure Environments for Software Development: Ensure that all components of the environments for software development are strongly protected from internal and external threats to prevent compromises of the
environments or the software being developed or maintained within them. Examples of environments for software development include development, build, test, and distribution environments.
To satisfy SSDF PO.5 in a Build and Deploy context using open-source tools, the focus shifts to:
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Protecting CI/CD infrastructure from internal and external threats.
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Hardening build servers, container registries, and deployment systems.
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Ensuring build and deploy environments are patched, monitored, and access-controlled.
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Preventing malicious code or tampering in the software supply chain.
Tasks |
Tools |
PO.5.1: PO.5.1: Separate and protect each environment involved in software development.
PO.5.2: Secure and harden development endpoints (i.e., endpoints for software designers, developers, testers, builders, etc.) to perform development-related tasks using a risk-based approach.
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Jenkins Configuration as Code + Role Strategy Plugin
Secures Jenkins build servers with codified configs and RBAC to limit access to critical build jobs.
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Tekton Pipelines
GitOps deployment with RBAC and signed commit enforcement for production deploys.
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Argo CD
GitOps deployment with RBAC and signed commit enforcement for production deploys.
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Vault by HashiCorp
Protects secrets in build and deploy environments, preventing leakage in pipelines
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Sigstore Cosign
Signs build artifacts and verifies them before deployment to ensure no tampering occurred.
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In-toto
Provides end-to-end software supply chain security, ensuring each step in build/deploy is signed and verified.
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Inspec
Runs ongoing compliance scans against development and build servers; enforce CIS/NIST benchmarks.
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SLSA + slsa-verifier
Verifies build provenance, ensuring artifacts come from a trusted, uncompromised build environment.
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Trivy
Scans build/deploy infrastructure containers and images for vulnerabilities and misconfigurations.
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Falco
Runtime security for build and deploy environments to detect malicious behavior or unauthorized activity.
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Auditbeat
Monitors build and deploy servers for file integrity changes, unauthorized access, and security events
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Kyverno
Enforces Kubernetes security policies in deployment environments (e.g., no privileged pods).
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2 - Protect the Software (PS)
Protect the Software (PS) for Build and Deploy CI/CD Steps
Protect the Software (PS)
Protect the Software (PS): Organizations should protect all components of their
software from tampering and unauthorized access.
PS.1
Protect All Forms of Code from Unauthorized Access and Tampering : Help prevent unauthorized changes to code, both inadvertent and intentional, which could circumvent or negate the intended security characteristics of the software. For code that is not intended to be publicly accessible, this helps prevent theft of the software and may make it more difficult or time-consuming for attackers to find vulnerabilities in the software.
To satisfy SSDF PS.1 in a build and deploy context using open-source tools, the focus shifts from just defining to:
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Secure the CI/CD pipeline itself – ensure only trusted, authenticated processes can produce build outputs.
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Protect source inputs and dependencies, lock versions, use checksums, and prevent injection of malicious code into the build process.
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Sign artifacts and record provenance, generate cryptographically verifiable metadata proving what was built, from which source, and by whom.
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Enforce reproducible builds so that any tampering results in a hash/signature mismatch.
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Restrict build system access and enforce role-based permissions, MFA, and least privilege for build servers
Tasks |
Tools |
PS.1.1: Store all forms of code including source code, executable code, and configuration-as-code based on the principle of least privilege so that only authorized personnel, tools, services, etc. have access.
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cosign Sigstore
Sign build outputs (binaries, containers, SBOMs) and create attestations; verify in CI before promotion.
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Git signed commits/tags
Require signed commits/tags and reject unsigned in CI to prevent unauthorized code from entering builds.
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Sigstore Fulcio + Rekor
Issue short-lived certs (Fulcio) and record signatures/attestations in a transparency log (Rekor) to detect/trace tampering.
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SLSA provenance (generators + verifier)
Emit and sign build provenance; verify who/what/where built the artifact before it can ship.
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In-toto
Define a supply-chain layout and verify each step’s materials/products to ensure nothing was tampered across the pipeline.
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Tekton Chains
Automatically sign task results (images, files) in Tekton pipelines and store attestations (e.g., in Rekor).
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Notation (CNCF Notary v2)
Sign OCI artifacts (images, Helm charts) during build for later verification in registries and clusters.
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Nix
Lock inputs and make builds deterministic so unauthorized changes are detectable by hash/provenance mismatch.
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Bazel
Lock inputs and make builds deterministic so unauthorized changes are detectable by hash/provenance mismatch.
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Grafeas
Persist signatures, SBOMs, and policy metadata to audit build integrity across services..
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Harbor
Enforce content trust, robot accounts, and policy on who can push/pull; require signed artifacts before release..
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Sigstore Policy Controller
Admission controller that blocks unsigned/incorrectly signed images; enforces key/issuer/subject policies.
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Kyverno
Kubernetes policies that require image signatures, pin by digest, and forbid mutable tags in deployments.
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OPA Gatekeeper
Gate deployments with custom policies (e.g., “only signed images from approved registries/namespaces”).
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Ratify
Verifies OCI signatures/attestations (Cosign/Notation) at admission time and blocks anything that fails verification.
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Connaisseur
Kubernetes admission controller dedicated to verifying container image signatures before scheduling.
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Sigstore Cosign
Verify signatures/attestations as a release gate in your CD pipeline prior to applying manifests.
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PS.2
Provide a Mechanism for Verifying Software Release Integrity: Help software acquirers ensure that the software they acquire is legitimate and has not been tampered with. Make software integrity verification information available to software acquirers.
To satisfy SSDF PS.2 in a build and deploy context using open-source tools, the focus shifts to:
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Generate integrity artifacts for every release
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Bind artifacts to versioned source
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Publish verification materials
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Require integrity checks as a release gate
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Expose verification data to consumers
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Admission control based on integrity
Tasks |
Tools |
PS.2.1: Make software integrity verification information available to software acquirers.
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cosign Sigstore
Sign binaries, container images, SBOMs, and attestations during build; supports keyless signing.
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Git signed commits/tags
Sign release tags to cryptographically tie the source to the built artifact.
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Sigstore Fulcio + Rekor
Fulcio issues ephemeral signing certs; Rekor logs all signatures in a tamper-evident transparency log for downstream verification.
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SLSA provenance (generators + verifier)
Automatically generate provenance metadata describing build origin, inputs, and process. Validates provenance files to ensure artifact integrity before distribution.
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In-toto
Defines a verifiable software supply chain layout; creates link metadata proving each build step.
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Grafeas
Stores metadata (signatures, checksums, SBOMs) so it can be queried for verification.
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GNU Coreutils / sha256sum
Create and publish checksums for release artifacts so recipients can manually or automatically verify integrity.
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Harbor
Enforce content trust; ensure only signed images are stored and distributed with policy on who can push/pull; require signed artifacts before release.
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Sigstore Policy Controller
Kubernetes admission controller enforcing signature/provenance policies before deployment. Admission controller that blocks unsigned/incorrectly signed images; enforces key/issuer/subject policies.
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Kyverno
Kubernetes policies that require image signatures, pin by digest, and forbid mutable tags in deployments. Validates signatures and digests for container images before they are deployed.
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OPA Gatekeeper
Custom admission control to enforce artifact integrity and trusted signer policies.
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Ratify
Pluggable verification framework for OCI registries/images; works with Cosign, Notation, in-toto.
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Connaisseur
Kubernetes admission controller dedicated to signature verification and image trust policies.
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Notation
Signs OCI artifacts (containers, Helm charts) and verifies them prior to install or deployment.
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Sigstore Cosign
Used in CD pipelines or admission hooks to verify signatures and attestations match trusted keys/policies before promotion.
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PS.3
Archive and Protect Each Software Release: Preserve software releases in order to help identify, analyze, and eliminate vulnerabilities discovered in the software after release.
To satisfy SSDF PS.3 in a build and deploy context using open-source tools, the focus shifts to:
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Build: The emphasis is on capturing, storing, and securing every official release (source, binaries, SBOM, signatures, provenance) in immutable, versioned storage.
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Deploy: The emphasis is on ensuring only those archived, protected releases are used in production with immutability, digest pinning, and signature/provenance verification as enforcement mechanisms.
Tasks |
Tools |
PS.3.1: Securely archive the necessary files and supporting data (e.g., integrity verification information, provenance data) to be retained for each software release.
PS.3.2: Collect, safeguard, maintain, and share provenance data for all components of each software release (e.g., in a software bill of materials [SBOM]).
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Git (Release Tagging)
Create immutable, signed tags for each release; preserves source snapshot for auditing
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Git LFS
Store large binary release artifacts alongside source with integrity checks.
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Nexus Repository OSS
OSS Host and version control release artifacts (JARs, binaries, containers) with role-based access and checksum validation.
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JFrog Artifactory OSS
Archive build outputs in a controlled, versioned repository; supports checksums and retention policies.
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Harbor
Store container images with vulnerability scanning, RBAC, and signed content trust to preserve release integrity. Enforce immutable tags and prevent overwrites so deployed artifacts can always be traced back to the archived copy.
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OSS Review Toolkit
(ORT) Archive SBOMs, license files, and vulnerability reports alongside the release for compliance/audit.
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Sigstore Cosign
Sign release artifacts before archiving so integrity can be checked later.
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Kyverno
Enforce digest-pinned images to ensure deployments always match archived release versions.
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OPA Gatekeeper
Policy enforcement to ensure only archived, approved artifacts are deployed.
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Ratify
Verifies artifact signatures/attestations against archived release metadata before deployment..
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Connaisseur
Admission controller that enforces deployment of only signed images from the archived se
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Backblaze B2 / Rclone (OSS integration)
Long-term archival of deployed artifact versions for rollback or investigation.
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SLSA Provenance + Rekor
Retain build provenance in a transparency log so deployed releases can be cross-verified with archived originals
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3 - Produce Well-Secured Software (PW)
Produce Well-Secured Software (PW) in the Build and Deploy CI/CD Steps
Produce Well-Secured Software (PW)
Organizations should produce well-secured software with minimal security vulnerabilities in its releases.
PW.1
Design Software to Meet Security Requirements and Mitigate Security Risks: Identify and evaluate the security requirements for the software; determine what security risks the software is likely to face during operation and how the software’s design and architecture should mitigate those risks; and justify any cases where risk-based analysis indicates that security requirements should be relaxed or waived. Addressing security requirements and risks during software design (secure by design) is key for improving software security and also helps improve development efficiency.
To satisfy SSDF PW.1 in a build and deploy context using open-source tools, the focus shifts to:
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Embedding security controls directly into the build process
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Validating that build outputs (binaries, containers, packages) are hardened and free from known design-level weaknesses
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Preserving traceability from design requirements to deployed artifacts
Tasks |
Tools |
PW.1.1: Use forms of risk modeling, such as threat modeling, attack modeling, or attack surface mapping to help assess the security risk for the software.
PW.1.2: Track and maintain the software’s security requirements, risks, and design decisions.
PW.1.3: Where appropriate, build in support for using standardized security features and services (e.g., enabling software to integrate with existing log management, identity management, access control, and vulnerability management systems) instead of creating proprietary implementations of security features and services.
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Semgrep
Prevents insecure code from being packaged and deployed.
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Trivy
Ensures that deployed artifacts align with secure baseline configurations
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Zap (Zed Attack Proxy)
Enforces approved component lists and security baselines before deployment.
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Syft
Generates SBOMs for deployed applications for ongoing monitoring.
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OWASP Dependency-Track
Enforces approved component lists and security baselines before deployment.
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Grype
Focused vulnerability scanning for deployed artifacts.
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Nix
Guarantees that build artifacts match the security-approved design exactly, with no drift or environmental differences.
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GNU Guix
Ensures that all deployed artifacts are built from a traceable, verifiable environment that aligns with design security baselines.
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Bazel
Enforces secure build rules, prevents unauthorized changes, and produces identical outputs across build agents.
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Reproducible Builds Framework
Strengthens supply chain security by detecting unauthorized modifications between source and deployment.
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Apko (Chainguard)
Implements secure design principles like minimal attack surface and verified dependency selection.
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Sigstore(Cosign,Fulcio, Rekor)
Ensures artifacts come from a trusted, verified build process and haven’t been altered.
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Notary
Provides cryptographic assurance that deployed artifacts are authentic and untampered.
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In-Toto
Enforces integrity and accountability across the entire build-to-deploy pipeline.
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The Update Framework (TUF)
Protects the integrity of deployment and update distribution channels.
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OpenSSL
Generate and manage keys for signing build artifacts. Implement TLS/SSL for secure communication between build agents and artifact repositories.
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GnuPG
Sign source code, commits, and build outputs and verify signatures before deploying artifacts.
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Bouncy Castle
Embed cryptographic signing and verification into Java/.NET build pipelines.
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Keylime
Validate that deployment environments meet hardware-based integrity requirements before deployment.
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Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS)
Publish cryptographic attestations of build provenance or deployment approvals and provide a decentralized, tamper-proof audit log of artifact trust data.
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Kyverno
Enforce secure deployment design policies (e.g., approved base images, disallowed configurations).
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OPA
Enforce security design requirements at build time (e.g., dependency approval, CVE thresholds). Apply consistent policy enforcement from build pipelines to runtime.
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SPIFFE/SPIRE
Ensure that deployed workloads meet security requirements for mutual authentication and zero trust and bind workload identity to build-time provenance for deployment integrity.
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OWASP Threat Dragon
Embeds threat models into CI/CD, ensuring security requirements are tied to architectural components before build. (Meets PW.1.1 and PW.1.2)
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OWASP Amass
Helps to refine security requirements around network exposure and asset inventory. (Meets PW.1.1)
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CAIRIS
Integrates security requirements into system models, which can then be validated in build & deploy. (Meets PW.1.1)
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Threagile
Embeds threat models into CI/CD, ensuring security requirements are tied to architectural components before build. (Meets PW.1.1)
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Open-Needs
Requirements management tool for defining, tracking, and validating security requirements. Documents security requirements and links them to commits and build outputs.(Meets PW.1.1 and PW.1.2)
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rmtoo
Requirements management tool using plain text and version control for traceability. Supports traceability from design through build, ensuring requirements are carried into final artifacts.(Meets PW.1.2)
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OpenRMF® OSS
Open-source compliance and risk management framework tool for tracking RMF (NIST 800-37) controls. Security requirements map to formal compliance controls that can be verified in build & deploy artifacts. (Meets PW1.2)
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PW.2
Review the Software Design to Verify Compliance with Security Requirements and Risk Information:Help ensure that the software will meet the security requirements and satisfactorily address the identified risk information.
To satisfy SSDF PW.2 in a the build and deploy context using open-source tools, the is:
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Validating security architecture decisions before deploying
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Reviewing IaC and CI/CD configs to ensure they meet security baselines
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Enforcing design rules automatically in build pipelines
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atching misconfigurations and security gaps before release
Tasks |
Tools |
PW.2.1: Have 1) a qualified person (or people) who were not involved with the design and/or 2) automated processes instantiated in the toolchain review the software design to confirm and enforce that it meets all of the security requirements and satisfactorily addresses the identified risk information.
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OPA
Automated design compliance gate in CI/CD
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Kyverno
Validates deployment configurations match approved security architecture.
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Checkov
Enforce network segmentation rules, encryption requirements, and secure defaults.
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KICS (Keeping Infrastructure as Code Secure)
Adds IaC review automation to the build process.
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Semgrep
Automated code review for alignment with security design requirements.
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Trivy (Config Scanning)
Config compliance verification before deploying.
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ThreatSpec
Ensures threat model-driven design requirements are implemented.
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Cartography
Post-build/pre-deploy architecture verification. Detect deviations from intended architecture.
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kube-score
Review Kubernetes manifests for design compliance before deployment.Ensures pod security settings match approved deployment designs.
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Dependabot
Automated dependency update PRs with vulnerability alerts. Helps verify dependencies meet security requirements (e.g., no known CVEs, minimum versions).
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OpenRMF
Open Risk Management Framework tracking tool. Can map design-level security requirements to NIST 800-53 controls and verify those controls are implemented in build configs.
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ESLint
Runs in CI/CD pipelines or as a pre-commit hook to block merges if code violates the approved security or architectural rules before build.
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Grype
SBOM-driven vulnerability scanner for images/filesystems. Validates that dependencies in the build match security baselines and are free from disallowed components.
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Clair
Static vulnerability analysis for container images. Confirms final images meet design security requirements before deployment.
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Terrascan
IaC scanning and policy enforcement (OPA-based). Enforces approved security design in Terraform, Kubernetes, Docker, and AWS CloudFormation configs before deploy.
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Gerrit
Code review and approval workflow tool. Enforces human review against design and security requirements before merge to release branches.
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PW.4
Reuse Existing, Well-Secured Software When Feasible Instead of Duplicating Functionality : Lower the costs of software development, expedite software development, and decrease the likelihood of introducing additional security vulnerabilities into the software by reusing software modules and services that have already had their security posture checked. This is particularly important for software that implements security functionality, such as cryptographic modules and protocols.
Note: PW.3 moved to PW.4
To satisfy SSDF PW.4 in a build and deploy context using open-source tools, the focus shifts to:
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Baking secure defaults into application code, containers, and deployment manifests
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Removing insecure, legacy, or unnecessary features from build artifacts
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Automatically applying baseline security settings during deployment
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Enforcing hardening standards before release
Tasks |
Tools |
PW.4.1: Acquire and maintain well-secured software components (e.g., software libraries, modules, middleware, frameworks) from commercial, opensource, and other third-party developers for use by the organization’s software.
PW.4.2: Create and maintain well-secured software components in-house following SDLC processes to meet common internal software development needs that cannot be better met by third-party software components.
PW.4.3: Moved to PW.1.3
PW.4.4: Verify that acquired commercial, open-source, and all other third-party software components comply with the requirements, as defined by the organization, throughout their life cycles.
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Kyverno
Ensures manifests meet secure baseline defaults before deployment.
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OPA
Validates default configurations meet security requirements.
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Checkovn
Detects and blocks insecure defaults in Terraform, Helm, or CloudFormation before release.
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KICS (Keeping Infrastructure as Code Secure)
Validates hardened defaults in cloud infrastructure provisioning.
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Trivy
Automated config compliance check during CI/CD.
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CIS-CAT Lite
Automates compliance testing for secure defaults.
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DevSec Hardening Framework
Bakes hardened defaults into container or VM images before release.
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kube-score
Pre-deployment validation of secure defaults in manifests.
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OpenSCAP
Ensures deployed OS images meet hardened defaults.
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CycloneDX
SBOM format for documenting exact components/configurations in final build; helps verify secure defaults are present.
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SPDX
SBOM standard to record all components, licenses, and provenance; can confirm inclusion of hardened dependencies.
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ArtifactHub
Catalog of verified Helm charts, OLM operators, etc.; can enforce use of curated, secure-by-default packages.
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JFrog Artifactory OSS
Repository manager for storing signed, verified artifacts with access controls.
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Sonartype Nexus OSS
Host artifacts and enforce policy checks before they’re promoted.
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Harbor
OCI registry with vulnerability scanning, content signing, and policy enforcement for images.
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GitLab Signing
Commit/tag signing in GitLab CE for provenance.
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GitHub CodeQL
Detects code patterns violating security requirements.
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AquaSec Trivy
Scans container images, IaC, and configs for insecure defaults.
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Allstar
GitHub App enforcing security policies in repos.
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OWASP SAMM
Security maturity model to guide secure default practices.
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OWASP ASVS
Application security requirements to verify secure defaults.
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OWASP Defectdojo
Central vulnerability tracking; ensures issues found in builds are fixed before release.
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OWASP Dependency-Check
Detects known-vulnerable dependencies in builds.
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Gitea
Self-hosted Git service with signing/policy support.
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GitLab (Community Edition)
Git platform with signing, scanning, CI/CD policy integration.
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Pytest
Automated testing to confirm defaults work.
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Selenium
Functional/UI test automation to verify secure settings.
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Playwright
Functional/UI test automation to verify secure settings.
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OWASP ZAP
DAST scanner to verify app defaults are not exploitable.
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TestNG
Java test framework for security/functional checks
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Cucumber
BDD framework for verifying functional + security requirements.
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Clair
Image vulnerability scanner for OCI registries.
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Grype
SBOM-driven vuln scanner for builds and images
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Bandit for Python
Detects insecure code patterns/defaults in Python.
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Semgrep
Finds policy-violating patterns in code.
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Brakeman
Detects Rails-specific security issues/defaults.
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Gitleaks
Detects secrets in code (prevents default creds exposure).
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TruffleHog
Finds secrets in repos/history to avoid insecure defaults.
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OWASP Dependency-Check
Detects known-vulnerable dependencies in builds.>
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OSS Review Toolkit (ORT)
Automates license/security checks; blocks noncompliant components.
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FOSSA (Community Edition)
License/dependency scanning; ensures compliance with default policies.
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ScanCode Toolkit
Detects license, copyright, and security metadata in artifacts.
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Tern
Container image inspection for dependency/component details.
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Open Policy Agent (OPA)
Policy-as-code for build & deploy; blocks insecure defaults in configs/manifests.
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PW.5
Create Source Code by Adhering to Secure Coding Practices: Decrease the number of security vulnerabilities in the software, and reduce costs by minimizing vulnerabilities introduced during source code creation that meet or exceed organization-defined vulnerability severity criteria.
To satisfy SSDF PW.5 in a build and deploy context using open-source tools, the focus shifts to:
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Software artifacts are stored in secure, controlled repositories.
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Only approved, verified builds get stored and deployed.
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Repository access is restricted and auditable.
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Provenance and integrity checks are enforced before artifacts are accepted or deployed.
Tasks |
Tools |
PW.5.1: Follow all secure coding practices that are appropriate to the development languages and environment to meet the organization’s requirements.
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Artifactory Community Edition
Acts as the central trusted artifact repository.
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Nexus Repository OSS
Acts as the central trusted artifact repository.
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Harbor
Acts as the central trusted artifact repository.
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Sigstore(Cosign,Fulcio, Rekor)
Ensures repository contents are authentic and tamper-free.
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Clair
Ensures stored artifacts meet vulnerability requirements before deployment
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In-Toto
Enforces provenance checks at repository ingestion.
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The Update Framework (TUF)
Protects against repository and update tampering.
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Notary (v2)
Controls supply chain intake and internal artifact storage.
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Tekton Chains
Ties repository artifacts back to secure build pipelines.
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Semgrep
Runs as part of the CI pipeline to automatically scan code for security flaws, policy violations, and unsafe patterns before artifacts are built. Supports rule-as-code to enforce secure build policies.
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Bandit for Python
Python-focused static analyzer that checks for insecure functions, weak crypto, and common security issues before packaging or deployment.
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FindBugs
Legacy Java static analysis; can be used to flag known insecure code patterns before build. Superseded by SpotBugs.
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SpotBugs
Modern replacement for FindBugs. Java bytecode scanner to enforce safe code practices before compiling final artifacts.
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SonarQube
Comprehensive SAST platform; can be integrated in CI/CD to enforce quality gates, stopping builds that fail security rules.
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OWASP ZAP
Runs against built/staged applications in pre-deployment environments to detect exploitable vulnerabilities, ensuring no insecure version is promoted.
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Arachni
Web application vulnerability scanner that can be part of a build’s QA stage to ensure secure release readiness.
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OWASP Dependency-Check
Scans for known-vulnerable dependencies in the build, blocking insecure versions from being deployed.
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PW.6
Configure the Compilation, Interpreter, and Build Processes to Improve Executable Security: Decrease the number of security vulnerabilities in the software and reduce costs by eliminating vulnerabilities before testing occurs.
To satisfy SSDF PW.6 in a build and deploy context using open-source tools, the focus shifts to make security testing continuous and automatic so every build and every deployment candidate is evaluated against a security bar, with evidence captured for audit and release gates.:
Tasks |
Tools |
PW.6.1: Use compiler, interpreter, and build tools that offer features to improve executable security.
PW.6.2: Determine which compiler, interpreter, and build tool features should be used and how each should be configured, then implement and use the approved configurations.
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Semgrep
Fast rule-based SAST with CI integration.
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SonarQube Community
General code quality + basic security rules.
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Bandit
Python SAST linters.
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Gosec
Go SAST linters.
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Brakeman
Rails SAST linters.
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FindSecBugs
Java SAST linters.
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Trivy
Vulnerability scan images/filesystems against SBOMs.
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Grype
Vulnerability scan images/filesystems against SBOMs.
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Syft
Generate SBOMs (SPDX/CycloneDX) during build.
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OWASP Dependency Track
Continuous SBOM monitoring and alerting post-build./p>
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Gitleaks
Block commits/builds that contain secrets; run in CI and as pre-commit hooks.
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Reproducible Builds
Provides methods, guidelines, and supporting tools for deterministic builds, ensuring integrity and verifiability of source-to-binary outputs.
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Bazel
Build system with hermetic (sandboxed) execution and explicit dependency tracking, preventing hidden or unverified dependencies.
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Meson
High-speed, deterministic build system that supports reproducibility and strict configuration-as-code.
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Apache Maven
Enforces controlled dependency resolution and supports reproducible builds for Java and JVM-based projects.
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Yocto Project
Creates reproducible, controlled build environments for embedded Linux images, preventing environmental drift.
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AOSP Build System
Uses prebuilt toolchains and sandboxed environments for secure, reproducible Android builds.
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PW.7
Review and/or Analyze Human-Readable Code to Identify Vulnerabilities and Verify Compliance with Security Requirements: Help identify vulnerabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities. Human-readable code includes source code, scripts, and any other form of code that an organization deems human readable.
To satisfy SSDF PW.7 in a build and deploy context using open-source tools, the focus shifts to:
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Running automated code scanning in CI
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Ensuring manual/peer review requirements are enforced before merging to release branches
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Verifying code matches security policies defined earlier in PW.1 and validated in PW.2- Capturing audit evidence that review was completed before build artifacts are promoted
Tasks |
Tools |
PW.7.1: Determine whether code review (a person looks directly at the code to find issues) and/or code analysis (tools are used to find issues in code, either in a fully automated way or in conjunction with a person) should be used, as defined by the organization.
PW.7.2: Perform the code review and/or code analysis based on the organization’s secure coding standards, and record and triage all discovered issues and recommended remediations in the development team’s workflow or issue tracking system.
|
Semgrep
Runs automatically in CI before building deployment artifact.
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SonarQube Community Edition
Integrates with CI/CD to enforce clean code before release
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CodeQL
Detect SQL injection, XSS, or unsafe deserialization patterns in codebase.
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GitLeaks
Protects against secret leakage in deployed artifacts
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GitHub and GitLab
Require two reviewers for any code changes in security-critical modules.
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DefectDojo
Provides verifiable audit trail for security review completion.
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Sigstore Cosign
Provides verifiable audit trail for security review completion.
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OWASP Dependency-Check
Continuously scans dependencies in each build for new CVEs. Can run on every commit or nightly in CI/CD.
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OWASP ZAP
Can be automated in CI/CD to re-test staging environments for vulnerabilities as new code is deployed.
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Retire.js
Focused on JavaScript libraries; detects newly disclosed vulnerabilities in frontend/back-end packages during builds.
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Fossa
Scans dependencies for vulnerabilities and license issues, integrating with builds to catch new findings.
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Bandit for Python
Runs in CI/CD for Python projects to catch newly introduced security issues.
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Checkmarx KICS
Detecting Known Vulnerabilities – Compares IaC components and configurations against known security best practices and compliance frameworks (CIS Benchmarks, NIST, PCI-DSS).
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Cppcheck for C++
Re-scans C/C++ code after every build to ensure no new issues were introduced.
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FindSecBugs
Extension to SpotBugs that catches security flaws in Java bytecode continuously during the build cycle.
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GitHub CodeQL
Performs continuous security queries on code with each pull request or scheduled scan.
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PMD
Runs code quality and security rule checks on every commit/build.
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SpotBugs
Java static analysis integrated into the build pipeline for continuous vulnerability detection.
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Danger JS
Automates security-related PR review rules, preventing unsafe code from merging.
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PW.8
Test Executable Code to Identify Vulnerabilities and Verify Compliance with Security Requirements: Help identify vulnerabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released in order to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities and improves traceability and repeatability. Executable code includes binaries, directly executed bytecode and source code,
and any other form of code that an organization deems executable.
To satisfy SSDF PW.8 in a post-deployment context using open-source tools, the focus shifts to:
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Running security tests against the final artifact in staging or pre-deployment environments
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Validating runtime configuration, dependencies, and permissions of the artifact
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Ensuring compliance with security baselines at the executable level
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Capturing evidence of artifact test results for compliance gates
Tasks |
Tools |
PW.8.1: Determine whether executable code testing should be performed to find vulnerabilities not identified by previous reviews, analysis, or testing and, if so, which types of testing should be used.
PW.8.2: Scope the testing, design the tests, perform the testing, and document the results, including recording and triaging all discovered issues and recommended remediations in the development team’s workflow or issue tracking system.
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Trivy
Run as a CI step after image build, before push to registry
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Grype
Confirms that final executable meets vulnerability thresholds.
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Syft
Feeds SBOM into SCA tools like Dependency-Track for ongoing monitoring
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OpenSCAP
Ensures final artifact matches secure configuration requirements.
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CIS-CAT Lite
Baseline enforcement step before promotion to production.
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Zap (Zed Attack Proxy)
Pre-release runtime security testing.
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In-toto + Sigstore Cosign Attestations
Provides verifiable evidence for compliance and audits.
|
PW.9
Configure Software to Have Secure Settings by Default: Help improve the security of the software at the time of installation to reduce the likelihood of the software being deployed with weak security settings, putting it at greater risk of compromise.
To satisfy SSDF PW.9 in a build and deploy context using open-source tools, the focus shifts to:
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Embedding secure configs into container images, binaries, and IaC
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Removing insecure or unused features before packaging
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Applying security baselines (CIS, STIG, NIST) in the build process
-
Validating those defaults as part of CI/CD
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Preventing insecure defaults from slipping into release candidates
Tasks |
Tools |
PW.9.1: Define a secure baseline by determining how to configure each setting that has an effect on security or a security-related setting so that the default settings are secure and do not weaken the security functions provided by the platform, network infrastructure, or services.
PW.9.2: Implement the default settings (or groups of default settings, if applicable), and document each setting for software administrators.
|
DevSec Hardening Framework
Automates baseline hardening during image creation.
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Chainguard Apko
Produces secure-by-default container images.
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Trivy
CI gate to block insecure defaults from being built/deployed.
|
Checkov
Prevents insecure IaC defaults from reaching deployment.
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KICS
Prevents insecure IaC defaults from reaching deployment.
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OpenSCAP
Produces compliance evidence before artifact promotion.
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Sigstore Cosign + In-Toto
Ensures only hardened, verified artifacts can be deployed.
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CIS-CAT Lite
Verify hardened defaults match CIS requirements before release.
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Kyverno
Policy enforcement for manifests and configs at build time.
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OPA Conftest
Codifies secure defaults as enforceable CI/CD policies.
|
4 - Respond to Vulnerabilities (RV)
Respond to Vulnerabilities (RV) for Build and Deploy CI/CD Steps
Respond to Vulnerabilities (RV)
Respond to Vulnerabilities (RV): Organizations should identify residual vulnerabilities
in their software releases and respond appropriately to address those vulnerabilities and prevent similar ones from occurring in the future.
RV.1
Identify and Confirm Vulnerabilities on an Ongoing Basis: Help ensure that vulnerabilities are identified more quickly so that they can be remediated more quickly in accordance with risk, reducing the window of opportunity for attackers.
To satisfy SSDF RV.1 in a build and deploy context using open-source tools, the focus shifts to continuously gathering vulnerability intel (VDP + public sources), monitor components, and confirm issues across supported releases.
Tasks |
Tools |
RV.1.1: Gather information from software acquirers, users, and public sources on potential vulnerabilities in the software and third-party components that the software uses, and investigate all credible reports.
RV.1.2: Review, analyze, and/or test the software’s code to identify or confirm the presence of previously undetected vulnerabilities.
RV.1.3: Have a policy that addresses vulnerability disclosure and remediation, and implement the roles, responsibilities, and processes needed to support that policy.
|
OSV-Scanner
Continuously scans manifests/locks against OSV; great for confirming new disclosures across all supported releases..
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Ortelius
Continuously synchronizes Software Bill of Material versions of built artifacts to OSV.dev reporting on vulnerabilities discovered post-build.
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OSV Vulnerability Database
Queries the OSV.dev vulnerability database for open-source package CVEs.
|
Grype
Scans container images and SBOMs for known vulnerabilities.
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Vulners CLI/API
Aggregates multiple public vulnerability feeds.
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cve-bin-tool
Checks installed binaries for known CVEs.
|
Semgrep
SAST for multiple languages; customizable rules. Run on merge to main branch.
|
Bandit
Python security linting. Add to Python project build stage.
|
SonarQube Community Edition
SAST & quality checks. Run in build step; block deploy if high-severity issues found.
|
OWASP ZAP
DAST; quick passive scan on deployed staging app.
|
GitHub Security Policy
Public policy location for reporters.
|
Disclose.io templates
Vulnerability Disclosure Program.
|
OpenSSF Vulnerability Disclosure Guide
Playbook for implementing disclosure.
|
RV.2
Assess, Prioritize, and Remediate Vulnerabilities: Help ensure that
vulnerabilities are remediated in accordance with risk to reduce the window of opportunity for attackers.
To satisfy SSDF RV.2 in a build and deploy context using open-source tools, the focus shifts to:
-
Recording each vulnerability
-
Analyze risk (exploitability & impact)
-
Choose responses, publish advisories, and deliver remediations via trusted mechanisms; include temporary mitigations where needed.\
Tasks |
Tools |
RV.2.1: Analyze each vulnerability to gather sufficient information about risk to plan its remediation or other risk response.
RV.2.2: Plan and implement risk responses for vulnerabilities.
|
GUAC
Aggregates SBOMs, attestations, and vulns to understand blast radius and prioritize fixes.
|
Renovate
Automates dependency upgrades/patch PRs with risk-aware policies.
|
Ortelius
Exposes the blast radius of each vulnerability across live environments.
|
DefectDojo
Centralizes vulnerabilities from SAST/DAST/SCA tools; adds risk scoring.
|
OWASP Dependency-Track
SBOM-based vuln tracking, includes CVSS scoring and metadata.
|
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System)
Rates probability of exploitation for CVEs (risk-based prioritization).
|
Vulners API
Provides exploit links, PoCs, and additional context per CVE.
|
CVSS Calculator (FIRST)
Standardized impact scoring to support triage decisions.
|
Sigstore / Cosign
Sign remediated builds before deploying (trusted delivery mechanism).
|
OWASP ModSecurity CRS
Temporary WAF rules to mitigate unpatched web vulns.
|
Falco
Runtime detection and mitigation for unpatched container/Kubernetes issues.
|
RV.3
Analyze Vulnerabilities to Identify Their Root Causes: Help reduce the frequency of vulnerabilities in the future.
To satisfy SSDF RV.3 in a build and deploy context using open-source tools, the focus shifts to:
Tasks |
Tools |
RV.3.1: Analyze identified vulnerabilities to determine their root causes.
RV.3.2: Analyze the root causes over time to identify patterns, such as a particular secure coding practice not being followed consistently
RV.3.3: Review the software for similar vulnerabilities to eradicate a class of vulnerabilities, and proactively fix them rather than waiting for external reports.
RV.3.4: Review the SDLC process, and update it if appropriate to prevent (or reduce the likelihood of) the root cause recurring in updates to the software or in new software that is created.
|
Semgreps
Write org-specific rules to detect the root-cause pattern; scan repos to eradicate classes of bugs.
|
CodeQL
Deep code queries to identify the precise coding constructs leading to vulns.
|
SonarQube CE
Provides issue traces, rule violations, and hotspots including root cause indicators.
|
DefectDojo
Tracks vulns + metadata, allows attaching root cause notes per issue.
|
Dependency-Track
Long-term tracking of vulnerable components to see recurring dependency issues.
|
Grafeas
Metadata API for tracking security events across builds/releases.
|
cwe-checker
Detects weakness patterns (CWEs) in binaries, useful for compiled artifacts.
|
Joern
Open-source code analysis platform for hunting bug patterns at scale.
|
OpenSAMM (OWASP Software Assurance Maturity Model)
Framework to improve secure dev lifecycle practices.
|
OpenSSF Scorecards
Automates repo security health checks (branch protection, dependency pinning, CI hardening).
|
OSCAL (NIST)
Standard for documenting compliance + SDLC security improvements.
|
Allstar (by OpenSSF)
Enforces security policies across GitHub orgs/repos.
|